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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, attention has focused on international human rights law,
but without much substantive discussion of what this law is, and how it
can be used in federal and state courts to protect human rights within and
outside the United States. In an attempt to fill that information gap for
practicing lawyers who are interested in utilizing international human
rights law, this Article examines past uses of international human rights
law in federal and state courts and analyzes its present status, with the
purpose of promoting more extensive use of international human rights
law by United States lawyers.
Use of international law in state and federal courts has traditionally
been limited to the application and enforcement of treaties to which the
United States is a party. Because the United States has ratified few human
rights treaties, protection of human rights in this manner has proven difficult. Recent federal and state court decisions, however, provide promising
precedents for additional applications of human rights law. Two significant developments can be identified: Federal courts have held that allegations of violations of customary international law may state a cause of
action; and, federal and state courts have relied upon international human
rights laws and standards to define and expand individual rights. This
Article addresses the developments in these cases and in cases involving
direct application of human rights treaties.
I.

A.

OVERVIEW

The Basic Documents of InternationalHuman Rights Law

Substantive international human rights law is codified in international
instruments drafted by governments acting within their capacity as member states of international governmental organizations. The organizations
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that issue instruments bearing directly on human rights in the United
States are the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS),
the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which is an organization independent of the United Nations.
More than forty documents of the United Nations and OAS are considered human rights instruments. Some are treaties, and others are declarations, the differences in legal effects are discussed in Part II of this Article.
Some cover a broad range of rights, e.g., the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, while others detail the content of one right or a group of
rights, e.g., the Convention on the Political Rights of Women.
The following instruments contain the core of international human
rights law and are the focus of this Article:
1. The Charter of the United Nations.'
2. The International Bill of Human Rights, consisting of four
instruments:
a. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal
Declaration);2
b. The International Covenant3 on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR);
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
c. The International
4
(ICCPR);
Protocol to the ICCPR (Optional
d. The Optional
5
Protocol).
Convention on Human Rights (American
3. The American
6
Convention).
In addition to these basic instruments, lawyers should be aware of the dozargument for the
ens of other instruments that could be used to advance an
7
courts.
state
and
federal
in
rights
human
of
protection
1. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
2. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Universal
Declaration].
3. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as ICESCR].
4. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as ICCPR].
5. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Optional Protocol].
6. American Convention on Human Rights, done Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 at
1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970), reprintedin 9
I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter cited as American Convention].
7. See, e.g., Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447, 30 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 88, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Declaration on Torture];
Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. Res. 2856, 26 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 29) at 93, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
done Dec. 16, 1966, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Convention on the
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The GreaterProtectionsAfforded by InternationalHuman Rights Law
International human rights law often provides greater protections to individuals and minority groups than domestic law.3 Numerous international provisions relating to criminal justice may provide greater
protection than do federal and state laws. 9 For example, the double jeopardy prohibition in international law may apply to successive state and
federal prosecutions permitted by the United States Constitution. Under
international law, a criminal offender is entitled to any legislated reduction
in penalty even though enacted after commission of the crime. Additionally, the international law guarantee of humane treatment in public institutions, including prisons and probably mental institutions, reaches further
than the eighth amendment. Other international provisions, generally not
part of federal and state laws, require compensation for victims of unlawful arrest or detention and the separation in detention facilities of accused
detainees from convicted detainees, and of juveniles from adults.
International prohibitions against many forms of discrimination are
more explicit and more extensive than federal and state prohibitions.' 0 Internationally prohibited discriminations include, in addition to those set
forth in federal and state laws, those based on political or other opinions,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. International law
specifically forbids the unequal treatment of men and women and urges
that mothers receive special protections for a reasonable time before and

B.

Elimination of Racial Discrimination, openedfor signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
[hereinafter cited as Convention on Discrimination]; Declaration on the Rights of the Child,
G.A. Res. 1386, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, First U.N. Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders Annex L.A at 67, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/6/I (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Standard Minimum Rules]; Convention on the Political Rights of
Women, openedforsignature Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S.
135; Convention on the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No.
6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, done Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter cited as Genocide Convention].
8. Although practitioners are probably more interested in those areas in which
international human rights law provides greater protection of individual rights than
domestic law, the similarities between international human rights law and federal and state
laws are worthy of mention. The civil and political rights guaranteed by the International
Bill of Human Rights closely parallel those guaranteed by the United States Bill of Rights,
including, for example, freedom of expression, right of association, freedom of thought and
religion, protections for persons in the criminal justice process, and due process in all
judicial proceedings. Few of the economic, social, and cultural rights set forth in the
international instruments as goals to be realized progressively to the maximum of each
signatory's resources are guaranteed by federal or state constitutions; however, federal and
state laws and regulations increasingly recognize the rights of access to such basic needs as
adequate food, health, education, housing, and the means to a decent living.
9. For a discussion of the greater protection offered by international provisions, see
infra Part IV.
10. For a discussion of international prohibitions against discrimination, see infra text
accompanying notes 247-62.
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after childbirth, including paid leaves or leaves with adequate social security benefits. The nondiscrimination provisions of international law afford
greater protections to aliens and to illegitimate children than the provisions of the United States Constitution. One convention explicitly declares
that limited affirmative action measures are not to be deemed discriminatory and, in fact, may be required when necessary to ensure the equal enjoyment of human rights.11
C

Three Usesfor InternationalHuman Rights Law

International human rights law may be applied by federal and state
courts in three ways. Probably the most promising use of international
human rights law is for guidance in interpreting federal and state civil liberties and civil rights laws. Courts may refer to international law in determining the intended content of federal and state laws in the same way that
they refer to legislative history. This use of international human rights law
is discussed in part IV. Second, under article VI of the United States Constitution, human rights provisions of treaties ratified by the United States
have the same status and effect as federal law. Human rights provisions
that are internationally accepted as authoritative interpretations of treaties
ratified by the United States may be applied pursuant to the same rules of
construction applicable to ratified treaty provisions. Part II discusses this
use of international human rights law. Third, human rights provisions
that are internationally accepted as legally binding are part of the body of
customary international law that courts may apply as part of or in a manner analogous to United States common law. This use of international
human rights law is discussed in part III.
II.

DIREcT ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

TREATY LAW

A.

Treatiesand Their Effect

A treaty is an international agreement to which governments become
parties by ratification in accordance with their own constitutional or statutory provisions. The United States ratifies a treaty by signature of the
President and the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.' 2 Under
United States Constitution article VI, clause 2 of section 2, a ratified treaty
is part of the supreme law of the land-of equal dignity with federal statutes. Conflicts between treaty provisions and existing United States law
are resolved according to three rules. First, a treaty may not infringe upon
the provisions of the United States Constitution.' 3 Second, if a treaty and
11. Convention on Discrimination, supra note 7.
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
13. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion).
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a federal statute conflict, the most recent prevails.14 Third, if a treaty and
state law conflict, the treaty controls.' 5 A well-established rule provides,
however, that courts should endeavor to construe a treaty and a statute on
the same subject in order to give effect to both.' 6 When possible, courts
construe treaties "in a broad and liberal spirit, and when two constructions
are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed
under it and the
7
other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred."'
Although the Constitution states simply that treaties are the law of the
land, courts have developed the doctrine of "self-executing treaties" to
qualify that rule.' 8 The doctrine, discussed in greater detail in section B,
allows courts to enforce only those treaty provisions that are capable of
judicial application without implementing legislation. Opponents of the
national use of international human rights law argue that in the absence of
implementing legislation, the provisions of human rights treaties are too
vague to permit judicial enforcement.' 9 International human rights experts, on the other hand, point out that many of the international human
rights provisions are no vaguer than, and at least as capable of judicial
20
enforcement as, the Bill of Rights.
The United States is party to the United Nations Charter, but is not
party to most other treaties that form the basic core of human rights law.
22
21
Although President Carter in 1977 did sign the ICESCR, the ICCPR
23
(but not the Optional Protocol), and the American Convention, the Senate has not given advice and consent to the treaties. Also signed but not
ratified are the Racial Discrimination Convention 24 and the Genocide
Convention. 25 These five signed treaties remain in the Senate for consideration. The only multilateral human rights treaties to which the United
14. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 18 n.34.
15. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508
(1947). See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920), in which the Court
concluded that the validity of a treaty was not undermined by a possible infringement on
states' rights under the tenth amendment unless it violated an express prohibition of the
Constitution.
16. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
17. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924).
18. Foster v. Neilsen, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
19. Oliver, The Treaty Power and National Foreign Policy as Vehicles for the
Enforcement of Human Rights in the United States, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 411 (1981).
20. See, e.g., Schachter, The Charterandthe Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions
in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643, 652 (1951); Wright, National Courts and Human
Rights-he Fujii Case, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 78 (1951). For a discussion of these two
views, see R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND POLICY 53-122 (1979). See also, Paust, LitigatingHuman Rights: A Commentary on the
Comments, 4 Hous. J.INT'L L. 81, 86-88 (1981); Paust, Litigating Human Rights in U.S.
Courts, 4 Hous. J.INT'L L. 137, 143-44 (1981).
21. ICESCR, supra note 3.
22. ICCPR, supra note 4.
23. American Convention, supra note 6.
24. Convention on Discrimination, supra note 7.
25. Genocide Convention, supra note 7.
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States is a party, other than the United Nations Charter, are three convenof Refugees, 27 and
tions on slavery, 26 the Protocol Relating to the Status
28
Women.
of
Rights
the Convention on the Political
The remainder of part II discusses the duties created by the United Nations Charter and how the issue of self-execution affects the enforcement
of those duties in federal and state courts. The duties created under the
UDHR, the ICESCR, and the ICCPR will be discussed in the context of
using the three documents as authoritative interpretations of basic United
Nations Charter obligations. Part II concludes with a discussion of the
OAS Charter and the human rights duties created thereunder.
B.

UnitedNations Charter
1. Human Rights Duties and Obligations

The United Nations Charter is a treaty that was signed on June 26, 1945,
in San Francisco at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on
International Organization and came into force on October 24, 1945. The
United States and every other member of the United Nations have agreed
to be bound by its provisions.
The United Nations Charter is the supreme international document providing for the protection and promotion of human rights. Its most significant human rights clauses are contained in articles 55 and 56. Article 55
provides that "the United Nations shall promote. . . universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Article 56 provides
that "[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in Article 55." When applying these clauses, the first question that
arises is whether the word "pledge" imposes on governments the legal obligation to respect and observe human rights. Discussions by the drafters
of the Charter show that the use of the word "pledge" was by no means
accidental. 2 9 In its ordinary meaning, "pledge" connotes an obligation,
and the International Court of Justice in one opinion found that its use
imposes a legal obligation:
26. Convention on Abolition of Slavery, done Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S.
No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol to Slavery Convention, done Dec. 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479,
T.I.A.S. No. 3532, 182 U.N.T.S. 51; Convention on Slavery, done Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat.
2183, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S. 551.
27. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 7.
28. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, supra note 7.
29. See Summary Report of Fourteenth Meeting of Committee II/3, Doc. 684, 11/3/38,
10 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 127, 130 (1945) (statement of the Delegate of Australia); Summary
Report of Fifteenth Meeting of Committee 11/3, Doc. 699, 11/3/40, 10 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 139
(1945); Summary Report of Seventeenth Meeting of Committee 11/3, Doc. 747, 11/3/46, 10
U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 160 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Summary Reports of Committee 11/3].
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Under the Charter of the United Nations, [South Africa] had
pledged itself to observe and respect, in a territory having an international status, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race. To establish instead, and to
enforce, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or
ethnic origin which constitute a denial of fundamental human
rights is 30
a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the
Charter.
The great jurist Egon Schwelb discussed the importance of this paragraph from the Namibia opinion and related clauses in the Charter:
When the Court speaks [in paragraphs 130 and 131] of "conformity with the international obligations assumed. . . under the
Charter," [and]. . .when it finds that certain actions "constitute
a denial of fundamental human rights" and classifies them as "a
flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter,"
it leaves no doubt that, in its view, the Charter does impose on
the Members of the United Nations legal obligations in the
human rights field.
The Court speaks of a violation of the purposes and principles
of the Charter [set out in articles 1 and 2]. . . . When the Court
finds that South Africa's policy constitutes a flagrant violation of
the purposes and principles of the Charter, it clearly does not intend to convey the idea that only Article 1(3) [referring to respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms] has been violated.
This follows from the fact that the Court refers to the pledge of
Member States which is contained in Chapter IX (Article 56) of
the Charter. What is meant is a violation of the relevant provisions of the Charter, Le., its human rights clauses, as a whole. 31
The United Nations Secretary General also relied on the Namibia opinion3 2 when he declared that article 56 imposes a legal obligation to respect
the human rights provision of article 55(c): "[T]he prohibition of distinctions made in the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms
on the grounds of race, sex, language or religion, has never been contested. . . ,,a3The pledge in article 56 calls for joint action, separate action, and cooperation with the United Nations. The drafters rejected a text
30. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J.
16, 57 (Advisory Opinion of June 21) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Opinion on Namibia].
31. Schwelb, The InternationalCourt of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the
Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 348-49 (1972). It should be noted that the prohibition
against racial, sexual, linguistic, and religious discrimination is mentioned throughout the
Charter, e.g., arts. 1(3), 13(1), and 76(c).
32. Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 16.
33. International Instruments and National Standards Relating to the Status of
Women, Study of Existing Conventions, Report of the Secretary-General, Economic and
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that merely provided for a pledge "to cooperate" with the organization. 34
Because these clauses create an affirmative obligation to promote human
rights, a violation of the obligation is a violation of the law of the land that
should be enforceable in federal and state courts. Under the doctrine of
self-executing treaties, however, courts may enforce only those treaty
clauses that are capable ofjudicial application without implementing legislation. This Article in the next section discusses the self-executing treaty
doctrine and its application to articles 55 and 56 of the Charter.
In a number of cases United States courts have made references to the
35
Charter:
36
(1) Oyama v. California
A concurring opinion noted that the California Alien Land Law stands
as a barrier to the pledge by the United States, through ratification of the
Charter, to promote respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language, and religion.3 7 Further, the California law stands as an obstacle to "the free
'3 8
accomplishment of [United States] policy in the international field."
39

(2) Hurd v. Hodge
A dissenting opinion noted that the Charter provides that the United
Nations shall promote respect and observance for human rights, and that
all Members pledge to take joint and separate action for that purpose. The
opinion also noted a Canadian court's reliance on the Charter in ruling
that racial covenants are contrary to public policy and stated that continuation of such covenants would offset both adherence of the United States
and other member states to the Charter and the United States "desire for
international good will and cooperation."' 4
Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/552, at 8 (1972). See also the Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 28) at 122, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (human rights obligations comprise a "duty" of
states); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 33
(Judgment of Feb. 5); Paust, LitigatingHuman Rights in US. Courts, supra note 20, at 14243.
34. Summary Reports of Committee 11/3, supra note 29.
35. See also United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66-67 (2d Cir.), cert
denied,421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Toscanino, 500
F.2d 267, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1974).
36. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
37. Id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 649-50 (Black, J., concurring).
39. 162 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
40. Id. at 245 (Edgerton, J., dissenting).
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(3) Namba v. MeCourt4
The majority opinion relied in part on the obligations of the United
States to the principles of articles 55(c) and 56 of the Charter in striking
down Oregon's Alien Land Law.
42
(4) Pauling v. McElroy
The court held that there is no conflict between the Atomic Energy Act
and the human rights provisions of the Charter and that, in a conflict, the
Atomic Energy Act would prevail as the supreme law of the land. The
court also asserted that the provisions of the Charter are not self-executing
43
and do not vest individuals with legal rights.

(5) Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. 44
The Court stated that there is no basis for inferring that the Court's
previously divided decision concerning racially restrictive covenants for
burial plots reflected a diversity of opinion on whether the language of the
Charter constituted a limitation on the rights of states and persons otherwise reserved to them under the United States Constitution. 45 The Court
recognized, however, that the Charter is an exercise of the treaty-making
power under the Constitution. Because the Court determined that recently
enacted Iowa legislation controlled the case, it did not decide the relevance
of the Charter.
46

(6) Katzenbach v. Morgan
The Court expressed no opinion on whether a clause of the Voting
Rights Act allowing ballots in languages other than Engligh could be sustained as a measure to discharge certain United States treaty obligations
under the Charter.47
48
(7) People of Saipan v. United States Department of Interior
A concurring opinion4 9 found that the Charter is not self-executing and
does not create rights that are justiciable between individual litigants. The
opinion cited Pauling50 as a straightforward holding that the Charter is not
self-executing and Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service5 ' as

41. 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949).
42. 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958), af'dper curiam on other grounds, 278 F.2d 252
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960).
43. 164 F. Supp. at 393. In accord on the latter point is Dreyfus v. Von Fink, 534 F.2d
24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976).
44. 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
45. Id. at 73.
46. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
47. Id. at 646 n.5.
48. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1974).
49. 502 F.2d at 100-02 (Trask, J., concurring).
50. 164 F. Supp. at 390.
51. 343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
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holding that the Charter is a compact between sovereign nations and not
between individuals.
52
(8) Boyer v. Garrett
Plaintiffs relied on the Charter in arguing for the prohibition of racial
discrimination in athletic facilities. The court refused to consider the
Charter and found that the Charter is of no broader scope than the fourteenth amendment.
53

(9) Camp v. Recreation Boardfor Districtof Columbia
The court found that there was no merit in plaintiffs' contention that
54
segregated playground facilities contravene the Charter.
(10) Lareau v. Mansons5
In formulating a standard for determining when prison conditions constitute overcrowding and violate the due process rights of pretrial detainees, the court cited the obligations under articles 55 and 56 of the Charter
and the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
56
Prisoners.
57

(11) Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
In dismissing plaintiffs' claims alleging tortious acts, the court held that
the plaintiffs did not meet all the elements for a cause of action based on
violations of international human rights law and brought under the Alien
Tort Claims Act.58 The court also held that to confer federal jurisdiction a
treaty must contain a specific provision permitting a private cause of
59
action.
2. The Self-Executing Treaty Doctrine
The critical issue that must be considered is whether clauses of a ratified
treaty are self-executing. A self-executing clause specifies duties that directly confer rights by operation of the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution. 60 If a clause is self-executing, individuals may challenge-in federal or state courts-violations of those rights by government
or government officials. 61
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950).
101 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1952).
Id. at 13.
507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980), modfed, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1187 n.9 (construing Standard Minimum Rules supra note 7).
517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
See discussion infra note 74 and part III.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 8809, DIGEST
OF THE UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (1974); L. SOHN & T.

61. See
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Courts have used various tests to determine whether a clause is selfexecuting. One test ascertains whether the treaty "operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. '62 Another test ascertains the "intent of the parties" reflected in the treaty's words and, when the words are
unclear, in the circumstances surrounding the treaty's execution. 63 Recent
cases, however, have noted the limited value of the Foster test, and courts
have begun to look beyond the intent-of-the-negotiators test.64 The following three-step inquiry has been formulated by Stefan Riesenfeld, a
leading scholar:65/d) Whether the rights and duties of individuals are involved; b) whether the United States and other parties retain discretion to
determine whether and when to fulfill the obligation to give the words of
the treaty domestic effect; and c) whether congressional action is required
to fulfill the treaty obligation
Whether or not a clause is self-executing depends, therefore, on what
obligations the clause creates. If the obligation is merely to negotiate a
supplementary contract or to seek legislative action, the clause is not selfexecuting. Examples of clauses that are not self-executing include articles
43(3) and 45 of the United Nations Charter, which create duties to negotiate supplementary contracts and seek legislative action. Simply because a
provision requires future negotiation or legislative action does not, however, render it nonself-executing if the provision also creates specific obligations or proscribes certain acts. For example, articles 25, 100, and 105 of
the United Nations Charter have been interpreted as self-executing because they require governments to perform or to refrain from certain acts,
even though the same articles also require governments to negotiate supplementary contracts and seek legislative action. 66
Article 56 of the Charter, the major human rights clause in international
law, is another example of a provision that does not merely require future
BUERGENTHAL, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

(1973).
62. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829).
63. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1,
10-23 (1899); Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 539-43 (1884); United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 65-68 (1833); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 310-16; ef.
Neilson v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929) (unclear meanings should be resolved by
reference to the parties' negotiations and diplomatic correspondence).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876-77 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1980).
65. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GA7Tl- A Notable German
Judgment, 65 AM. J. INTL' L. 548, 550 (1971). See Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Sef.
Executing Treatiesand United States v. Postal: Win at Any Price?,74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892
(1980); Riesenfeld, The Powerof Congressandthe PresidentinInternationalRelations." Three
Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CAL. L. Rtv. 643, 652-53 (1937). See generally
Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treatiesand Community Law: A PioneerDecision
of the Court of Justice of the European Community, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 504 (1973);
Weissbrodt, UnitedStates RatiFcationofthe Human Rights Covenants, 63 U. MINN. L. REv.
35, 66-72 (1978).
66. See Keeney v. United States, 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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agreements. The International Court of Justice ruled in its 1971 Namibia
opinion that South Africa's aparthied policy in Namibia violated the
pledge contained in article 56. The Court reaches this conclusion despite
the fact that South Africa had taken no steps to incorporate the pledge into
its domestic law. Nothing in the opinion suggests that article 56 requires
South Africa and other governments to negotiate supplemental agreements
or to seek legislative action. Although international law does not contain a
self-executing doctrine, the Court's opinion may be cited for the proposiimposed by articles 55 and 56 are binding without
tion that the obligations
67
further action.
Sei Fujii v. Caifornia68 is an oft cited case in which the California
Supreme Court considered whether articles 55 and 56 of the Charter are
self-executing. The court held that an alien land law was invalid on the
ground that it violated the fourteenth amendment. Unfortunately, in doing so, the court first rejected the argument that the law was also a violation of articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. It found that those provisions
were not self-executing. 69 Although this statement is frequently cited for
the proposition that articles of the Charter are not self-executing, the statement was dictum and, therefore, is of dubious precedential value, even in
70
California.
The honorary editor in chief of the American Journal of International
Law observed some years ago that Fujii "was not appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, so the point remains unsettled for the country
as a whole."'7 1 Federal judges have cited the dictum in Fuii in various
opinions-in one district court case, it may have been crucial, 72 and two
courts of appeals mentioned it cryptically. 73 In no case, federal or state,
were its premises reexamined. 74
67. Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 16. For a discussion of the relation of
the self-executing doctrine to international law see Wright, supra note 20.
68. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
69. Id. at 724-25, 242 P.2d at 622.
70. See People v. Mimirani, 30 Cal. 3d 375, 388 n.1, 636 P.2d 1130, 1138 n.1, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 792, 800 n.1 (1981).
71. Finch, The Need to Restrain the Treaty-MakingPower of the United States Within
ConstitutionalLimits, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 72 (1954).
72. Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
73. Hitai v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 1959).
74. In re Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 157-58, 60
N.W.2d 110, 116-17 (1953) (holding the United Nations Charter has no application to the
private conduct of individual citizens of the United States), citedin Camacho v. Rogers, 199
F. Supp. at 158 (holding article 55 of the United Nations Charter is not self-executing). See
Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70, 73 (1955). On rehearing, the
Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted and vacated its previous order of
affirmance. The Court stated that although it was evenly divided in its previous opinion,
this reflected no diversity of opinion on the issue of the nonapplicability of the Charter. Id.
The recent case of Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C.
1981), is an example of a court expressing the need for a treaty to provide explicitly for a
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At present, Fujii seems archaic. According to one writer, "[i]t is unlikely
that Fujii. . . would be decided the same way today. ' 75 Indeed, the issue
of whether provisions of the Charter are self-executing must be reexamined in light of more recent decisions. The following question should be
answered: Does the Charter obligation (or other treaty provision) require
parties to refrain from violating human rights, to enact laws, or to meet
both these duties? The Fujii court correctly observed that "future legislative action by several nations would be required to accomplish the [Charter's] declared objectives .... ,"76 The court incorrectly concluded,
however, that those objectives were to be achieved solely by legislative action and that "[tlhe provisions in the charter pledging cooperation in promoting observance of fundamental freedoms lack. . . mandatory quality
and definiteness. . . . [They are framed as a promise of future
"77
action ....
The following points support an argument that the court's decision was
incorrect. First, not only did the International Court of Justice's Namibia
opinion imply the contrary in 1971,78 but almost every other United Nations organ and agency has rejected the California court's analysis. Second, the United States Government has rejected
the analysis when arguing
79
before the International Court of Justice.
private cause of action in order to base jurisdiction on international human rights law in
United States courts, without addressing specifically the language of the treaties themselves.
The cases cited by the court to support the argument that various treaties are not selfexecuting likewise do not consider the language of the treaty, nor do they cite any other
authority. See, e.g., Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958), aft'd, 278 F.2d 252
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960), citedin Hanoch Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 547.
In Ianoch Tel-Oren, the court, in a single paragraph without citation or reference to the
Charter itself, found three separate provisions of the Charter were nonself-executing. Id.
The opinion does refer to the possibility of an implied private right of action under a
treaty. The opinion does not consider, however, the particular provisions to determine
whether the language requires additional legislation for implementation. If the language
does not, a private cause of action may be implied. .d.
75. Schlitter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the United Nations
Charter, 61 CAL. L. REv. 110, 162 n.291 (1973). Cf. id. at 163 (referring to the western
approach to social change: "The legal approach may fail in countries whose judiciary is not
a relatively independent and socially innovative power, receptive to new impulses from
international law.").
76. 38 Cal. 2d at 722, 242 P.2d at 621.
77. Id. at 724, 242 P.2d at 621-22.
78. Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 16.
79. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1970 I.C.J.
Pleadings 843, 852-56 (written statement of the United States Government). See also id. at
75, 108-10 (written statement of the Security-General of the United Nations). For a more
detailed discussion of this issue, see Louden, he Domestic Application of International
Human Rights Law: Evolving the Species, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REy. 161, 190
(1981).
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3. Authoritative Interpretation: The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights
80
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration)
was unanimously adopted by resolution in the United Nations General
Assembly on December 10, 1948. The Universal Declaration was viewed
by many as a first step in the formulation of an International Bill of
Human Rights that would have both legal and moral force. Since 1948 the
impact of the Universal Declaration has been felt in three main areas. It
has been invoked as a standard, and its clauses have been incorporated in
decisions by United Nations organs and agencies; in international treaties;
81
and in national constitutions, national legislation, and court decisions.
Its thrust has been reaffirmed, and violations of its clauses have been de82
nounced in several United Nations and General Assembly resolutions.
The Universal Declaration is not a treaty and cannot be considered the
law of the land. Two arguments, however, support the notion that the
Universal Declaration has legal effect in federal and state courts. The first
argument is that the Universal Declaration has become part of the customary law of nations.8 3 The second argument is that the Universal Declaration constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the United Nations
Charter. Judge Tanaka, who dissented in the South West Africa case, endorsed this idea when he stated that "the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.. .although not binding in itself, constitutes evidence of the interpretation and application of the relevant Charter provisions ....,,84 Because the obligations created by articles 55 and 56 of the Charter lacked
clarity, the meaning of "human rights and fundamental freedoms" required further definition. The Universal Declaration was a notable first
step by the international community toward defining what rights and freedoms to promote and protect. By specifying those human rights and freedoms, the Universal Declaration interprets and implements the Charter
obligations. Therefore, it may be argued that as an interpretation of the
Charter, the Universal Declaration should be used in federal and state
courts.

80. Universal Declaration, supra note 2.
81. See Schwelb, The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on
InternationalandNationalLaw, 1959 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 217.
82. See E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: THE
RooTs AND GROWTH OF THE UNrVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 38-39 (1964).

See, e.g., Efforts and Measures for Securing the Implementation and the Enjoyment by
Youth of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 37/49, U.N. Doec. -, at - (1982); The Question of
Aging, G.A. Res. 37/51, U.N. Doec. -, at - (1982); Declaration on the Participation of
Women in Promoting International Peace and Co-operation, G.A. Res. 37/63, U.N. Dec. ,at -(1982); Measures to Improve the Situation and Ensure the Human Rights and Dignity
of All Migrant Workers, G.A. Res. 37/170, U.N. Doec. -, at - (1982).
83. This argument is discussed infra part III.
84. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. S. Afr., Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 293
(Judgment of July 18) (Tanaka, J., dissenting).
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Several cases in United States courts have referred to the Universal
Declaration:
(1) American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co.8 5
The Supreme Court upheld an Arizona constitutional amendment that
prohibited union, closed-shop arrangements. A concurring opinion 86 reprovides that
ferred to article 20(2) of the Universal Declaration, which
87
"[n]o one may be compelled to belong to an association.
88
(2) Wilson v. Hacker
The plaintiff, a bar owner, sought an injunction against union picketing.
One union excluded female members, and the plaintiff contended that an
agreement to hire only union members would force her to fire all female
employees. The court ruled for the plaintiff and cited the Universal Declaration's prohibition against distinctions based on sex as "indicative of the
spirit of our times."8 9

(3) Cramer v. Tyars90
The court found that the trial court's decision requiring testimony from
a person who was alleged to be mentally retarded and a danger to himself
or others was not harmless beyond all reasonable doubt. The testimony
was given in a commitment proceeding regarding behavior that allegedly
involved assaults. A dissenting opinion 9 1 found that the questioning, to
which the defendant responded with wild claims of attacks and illustrated
with swinging and punching motions, was cruel and degrading and violated article 5 of the Universal Declaration, which provides that "[n]o one
shall be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.."97
93
(4) Bixby v. Pierno
The court cited the Universal Declaration in support of its assertion that
the right to practice one's trade or profession is a fundamental right.94

(5) City of Santa Barbarav. Adamson 95
The court held that an ordinance drawing a distinction between related
and unrelated persons violated the California Constitution's right of
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

335 U.S. 538 (1948).
concurring).
Id. at 549 n.5 (Frankfurter, J.,
Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 20(2).
200 Misc. 124, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
Id. at 135, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
23 Cal. 3d 131, 588 P.2d 793, 151 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1979).
Id. at 151 n.1, 588 P.2d at 805, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 665 (Newman, J.,dissenting).
Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 5.
4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971).
Id. at 143 n.9, 481 P.2d at 251 n.9, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 243 n.9.
27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980).
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referred to articles 12, 16(3), 17(1), and 29(2)
privacy provisions. The court 96
of the Universal Declaration.
97

(6) Filartiga v. Peha-Irala

The court held that torture perpetrated under the color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of
human rights. The court used the Universal Declaration as evidence of

customary international law.
98

(7) In re Alien Children Education Litigation
The court held that a Texas statute prohibiting the use of state funds to

educate noncitizens or persons not lawfully admitted to the United States
violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. The
court also held that a state statute does not interfere with the United States
obligations under the United Nations Charter as interpreted by the Uni-

versal Declaration. 99

96. Id. at 130 n.2, 610 P.2d at 439 n.2, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542 n.2.
97. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The court discussed the Universal Declaration as an
"authoritative statement of the international community." Id. at 882-83. Filartigais further
discussed infra part III.
98. 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aft'd, No. 80-1807 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 1981), aff'd
sub nom Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
99. The reasoning relied upon by the court to reach this conclusion is questionable.
The court did not deal with the issue whether articles 55 and 56 are self-executing. Rather, it
discussed whether the Universal Declaration establishes rights with which individual states
cannot interfere. Although this sounds like a self-executing argument, in fact it is not
applicable to the Universal Declaration because the Universal Declaration is not a treaty,
but is an authoritative interpretation of a treaty. The first issue addressed should be whether
the treaty is self-executing.
Furthermore, the court did not specifically deal with the meaning of article 26(l) which
clearly states that "[e]veryone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in
the elementary and fundamental stages." Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 26(1).
Although legislation may be required to define the right, once education is provided, no
additional legislation is required to establish that "everyone" has the right to education and
that it shall be free.
The court, however, preferred not to deal with the meaning of the language of article 26.
Rather, it referred to other articles of the Universal Declaration and concluded that while
these all "represent standards toward which all societies should strive .... "it does not mean
that "the State of Texas intrudes into foreign relations if it denies a person the right to
education." In re Alien Children, 501 F. Supp. at 593.
The court's discussion of article 47 of the OAS Charter, as amended by the 1967 Protocol
of Buenos Aires, is more complete because it deals with the language of the provision. After
looking at the language, the court concluded that although it could be implied from some of
the language that there was an intention to create judicially enforceable rights, the article
taken as a whole requires implementing legislation to be given effect. Id. at 590. Compare
the language of article 47(a) of the Universal Declaration: "Elementary education,
compulsory for children of school age, shall also be offered to all others who can benefit
"(emphasis added) with
from it. When provided by the State itshallbewithout charge ..
article 47(b): "Middle-level education shall be extended progressively to as much of the
population as possible. . .

."

Universal Declaration, supra note 2, arts. 47(a), 47(b).

Clearly, no further legislation is required to establish that elementary education provided
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(8) Fernandez v. Wilkinson 100
The court held that the indeterminate detention of a Cuban refugee who
was not convicted of a crime in the United States and who was not determined to be a security risk violated customary international law. The
court used the Universal Declaration as an example of customary international law.
(9) American National
Insurance Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing
Commission10 1
The court cited article 2 of the Universal Declaration as an example of
an illustrative rather than restrictive definition of prohibited
discrimination. 10 2

4. Authoritative Interpretation: The International Convenants on
Human Rights
The two International Covenants on Human Rights-the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1o 3 and the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)1O4-are, like the Universal Declaration, considered by many to constitute an authoritative interpretation of
the human rights clauses of the United Nations Charter. 10 5 The Covenants were approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966,
and in 1976 entered into force as legally binding multilateral treaties when
ratified by the required thirty-five countries. At present, more than sixty
countries have become parties. The United States is not among them.
President Carter signed the Covenants in October 1977 but the Senate has
not yet given its consent.' 0 6
by the state shall be free. The In re Alien Children court, however, decided that if the whole
provision is not self-executing, the court could not give effect to those parts that are. The
court could have decided to the contrary, but it at least considered the language of article 47
of the Universal Declaration in reaching its conclusion, which it did not do in dealing with
the United Nations Charter and article 26 of the Universal Declaration.
100. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), affd sub nom. on other grounds, RodriguezFernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
101. 32 Cal. 3d 603, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1982).
102. Id. at 608 n.4, - P.2d at - n.4, - Cal. Rptr. at - n.4.
103. ICESCR, supra note 3.
104. ICCPR, supra note 4.
105. Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN

RIGHTS

38, 169 (1968).

106. The ICESCR establishes goals that ratifying governments agree to realize
progressively to the full extent of their available resources. Although the ICESCR specifies
that the goals are evolving standards, it can be argued that governments are bound by them
much as governments in the United States are bound by evolving standards of due process.
Numerous examples of the evolving standards of due process exist-for instance, fair
hearing requirements that protect public employees' liberty and property interests in their
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To determine the present obligation of the United States under the Covenants, it is necessary to analyze the status of a treaty signed by the President, but not consented to by the Senate. Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "[A] State is obliged to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty
when. . it has signed the treaty or. . .expressed its consent to be bound
by the treaty ....,,lO7 The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention but the Convention nevertheless may be used as an expression of
the international community's view on treaty obligations. Therefore, it
can be argued that, by signing the Covenants, the United States has at least
agreed to refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the purpose of the treaties. Furthermore, the United States has expressed in other agreements a
view of what its duties are with respect to the Covenants. In the Helsinki
Accords, for example, the United States as a party has pledged to "fulfill
[its] obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreeCovenants on
ments in this field, including inter alia the International
08
Human Rights, by which [it] may be bound."1
The Covenants, like the Universal Declaration, may be used as part of
the customary law of nations' °9 or as authoritative interpretations of the
United Nations Charter. The argument for the latter use is parallel to that
dealing with the Universal Declaration. The Covenants comprise the second half of the formulation of an International Bill of Human Rights and
jobs. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal. 3d
194, 539 P.2d 774, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1975).
The ICCPR guarantees fundamental civil liberties, due process, equal protection, and the
peoples' right to self-determination and control of their natural resources. Attached to the
ICCPR is the Optional Protocol, supra note 5, which enables citizens of ratifying countries
to file charges against their countries for serious violations of civil and political rights.
Complaints are filed with the Human Rights Committee, which was established under the
ICCPR for this purpose. The Optional Protocol provides a final appeal for individuals who,
for whatever reasons, have exhausted the available domestic remedies without obtaining
justice. President Carter did not sign the Optional Protocol, and therefore it was not
presented for the Senate's consent.
The ICCPR and the ICESCR are necessarily interrelated. A government cannot
guarantee one set of rights without being committed to the protection and realization of the
other. See ICCPR, supra note 4, preamble; ICESCR, supra note 3, preamble.
107. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/
27, reprintedin 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). The Treaty entered into force on January 27, 1980, and
thirty-five countries were parties to the Treaty as of December 1980. The United States
signed the Treaty in 1970, but has not ratified it. The United States, however, has used
provisions of the Treaty on some occasions. See, e.g., a letter from the Legal Advisor of the
epartment of State, Roberts B. Owen, to Adlai E. Stevenson dated September 12, 1980
which states: "While the United States has not yet ratified the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, we consistently apply those of its terms which constitute a codification of
customary international law." Nash, ContemporaryPracticeofthe United States Relating to
InternationalLaw, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 147 (1981).
108. Helsinki Accords done Aug. 1, 1975, art. l(a)(VII). U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, PUB. No.
8826, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295 (1975). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD

(Buergenthal ed. 1977).

109. For a discussion of the Covenants' use in customary international law, see infra part
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define even more specifically than the Universal Declaration the obligations created by articles 55 and 56 of the Charter." 0 Therefore, it is submitted that the Covenants may be used in federal and state courts as
interpretations of the Charter.
Whether the Covenants are used now as authoritative interpretations of
the Charter or directly as treaties when ratified, their precise language
must be examined to determine whether a particular obligation is selfexecuting and therefore confers private rights. An examination of the
Covenants reveals the obligation to "undertake," to "promote," and to
"ensure" the proper protection and enforcement of the rights enumerated
in the Covenants. A few provisions, however, envision that rights will be
given effect through further action of the parties. Article 11(2) of the
ICESCR, for example, states that:
[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take,
individually and through international cooperation, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific
knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a
way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization
of natural resources;
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing
and food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution
of world food supplies in relation to need."'
Although this article establishes the right to be free from hunger, it also
envisions the use of further measures to promote various aspects of the
right. Because these measures would probably require further legislation,
these subsections are not self-executing. Other provisions likewise contain
language mentioning "special measures" that must be taken,"12 "steps to
u 3 or laws that must be passed." 4 To the extent that further
be taken,""
legislation is required for implementation, these subsections are not selfexecuting.
Some provisions require no further action by governments to confer
rights on individuals. For example, the ICCPR provides that "[N]o one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
110. See, e.g., article 5 of the Universal Declaration, supra note 2, which states: "No one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
See also article 7 of the ICCPR, supra note 4, which states: "No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one
shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation."
111. ICESCR, supra note 3, art. 11(2).
112. Id. art. 10(3).
113. Id. arts. 12(2), 15.
114. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 20.

1983]

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation."' 1 5 Clearly, no further
legislation is required to prohibit these acts. The following United States
cases referred to the Covenants:
(1) People v. Levins"16
A concurring opinion referred to article 9(4) of the ICCPR as supporting
7
the right to a post-indictment preliminary hearing."
(2) New Hampshire v. Robert H. 118
The court invoked articles of both Covenants as determinative of an
international consensus on the recognition and protection of the family
unit as "the natural and fundamental unit of society .
."' 9
120
(3) Fernandez v. Wilkinson
The court cited various articles of the ICCPR as indications of customs
and usages of civilized nations.

12 1
(4) Filartigav. Peha-Irala
The court referred to article 7 of the ICCPR as an example of the universal prohibition against torture.

C

The Charterof the Organizationof American States
1. Human Rights Duties and Obligations

Membership in the Organization of American States (OAS) is open to
all states in the Western Hemisphere. There are presently twenty-five active members. 122 The OAS Charter 12 3 was ratified as a treaty by the
United States Senate following its adoption by the Ninth International
Conference of American States in BogotA in 1948. The Charter entered
into force on December 13, 1951.
The principal human rights provisions of the original Charter are contained in articles 3 and 16. Article 3 proclaims that all individuals of the
115. Id. art. 7.
116. 22 Cal. 3d 620, 586 P.2d 939, 150 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1978).
117. Id. at 625, 586 P.2d at 942, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 461 (Newman, J., concurring).
118. 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387 (1978).
119. Id. at 716, 393 A.2d at 1389.
120. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), af'd sub nom. on other grounds, RodriguezFernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). See supra text accompanying note
100; see also infra text accompanying notes 179-97.
121. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See supra text accompanying note 97; see also infra text
accompanying notes 150-78.
122. Cuba is officially a member state but has been excluded from participation in the
OAS since 1962.
123. Charter of the Organization of American States, done Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
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American states are accorded fundamental rights without distinction as to
race, nationality, creed, or sex and that member states must be politically
organized as representative democracies. 'Article 16 declares that each
state has the right to its own cultural, political, and economic development,
respecting, at the same time, individual human rights and "the principles
of universal morality."
At the Third Special Inter-American Conference in 1967, the OAS
membership adopted as an amendment to the Charter the Protocol of Buenos Aires (Protocol).1 24 The Protocol was ratified by the United States
Senate and entered into force on February 27, 1970. The Protocol substantially revises the Charter and elaborates on the economic, social, and cultural rights alluded to in the Charter. For example, the Protocol
enumerates the right to employment; just salaries; decent health and occupational conditions; free association among labor and management; and
education, including free, mandatory primary schooling. The uncertain
legal effect of the Charter raises the question whether the Charter mandates legally binding norms or merely proclaims broad principles. In a
1960 opinion the Inter-American Juridical Committee wrote that the
human rights articles are as much a legal obligation as any other part of
the Charter.1 25 In United States jurisprudence, however, the legal status of
the Charter has had a checkered history.
2. Legal Effect-Self-Executing?
In UnitedStates v. Toseanino,126 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit relied in part on provisions of the OAS Charter. The
defendant, an Argentine national taken into custody by United States narcotics agents in Uruguay, alleged that the action violated, among other
things, article 17 of the OAS Charter, which proclaims that the territory of
member states is inviolable. The court ruled that article 17 affirms a long27
standing principle of international law and upheld Toscanino's defense. 1
The human rights provisions of the Charter and the Protocol have also
124. Protocol of Buenos Aires, done Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, 6
I.L.M. 310.
125. Inter-American Juridical Committee, Study of the Juridical Relationship Between
Respectfor Human Rights and the Exercise of Democracy, 13-14 (Pan American Union:
Washington, D.C., May 1960).
126. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
127. Id. at 277-78. In a subsequent case with similar facts, the Second Circuit confined
its holding to cases in which the alleged violation of territorial inviolability has been
protested by a Charter signatory. In other words, the provision in question is designed to
protect the sovereignty of states. Individual rights are derivative of states' rights. United
States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1975). Presumably, a cause of action
that relies on a Charter provision which refers to individual rights would withstand the
court's objection. The defendant's argument in Toscanino has been rejected or distinguished
by the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974).
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been invoked in United States district court decisions. In Doe v. Pler,2 8
a case involving the education of children of undocumented aliens, the
court recognized that article 47 of the Charter, as amended, was partial
evidence of the United States Government's commitment to expanding educational opportunities for all children.' 29 The court failed, however, to
classify the Charter as "law" or "policy."
In In reAlien Children,130 a case based on almost identical facts, another
district court refused to grant article 47 supremacy over state law. The
court held that article 47 is not a self-executing treaty provision.' 3 ' Relying on Saipan v. UnitedStates Department ofthe Interior,132 the court ruled
that the treaty language must evidence the compacting parties' intention to
confer rights or obligations on the citizenry of their respective nations. If
in the words of Fujii, "to the
the language is uncertain, the court may look,
33
circumstances surrounding its execution."'1
The reasoning of In re Alien Children is open to attack on several
grounds. The requirement of self-execution has generated many legal
opinions and scholarly commentaries, and the analysis of whether article
47 is self-executing can hardly be confined to the two criteria articulated
by the court. At the very least, the three-step Riesenfeld inquiry 134 should
also be made. Indeed, the "surrounding circumstances" criterion alone is
an ambiguous concept. Moreover, the precedential value ofFujii on which
the court relied has been questioned by present-day jurists.' 35 Even if
these two criteria were acknowledged to be determinative of self-executing
treaties, room remains to question the court's construction of the language
of article 47.136 In fact, the court conceded that article 47, even if not selfexecuting, "demonstrates a federal commitment to education 37which [the
United States has] affirmed to the international community."'
3. Other OAS Human Rights Accords
Two other OAS human rights accords are possibly applicable to litigation in United States forums. The American Declaration of the Rights and
128. 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), affd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), 102 S. Ct.
2382 (1982).

129. 458 F. Supp. at 592.
130. 501 F. Supp. at 544. See discussion supra accompanying notes 98-99.
131. Id. at 590. Plaintiffs also argued that the Charter and other international human
rights instruments manifest a federal foreign policy that was usurped by the state statute in
question. The court rejected this argument owing, in part, to the absence of either a selfexecuting treaty provision or federal implementing legislation. Id. at 591.
132. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
133. 501 F. Supp. at 590.
134. See supra text accompanying note 65.
135. For a discussion of the precedential value of Fujii, see supra text accompanying
notes 68-79.
136. See supra note 99.
137. In re Alien Children, 501 F. Supp. at 591.
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Duties of Man (American Declaration),138 adopted at the same time as the
Charter, enumerates a number of individual rights. In addition to the freedoms guaranteed by the United States Bill of Rights, the American Declaration includes the rights to education, employment, cultural participation,
leisure time, social security, health care, free movement, establishment of a
family, and privacy. The American Declaration does not have treaty or
convention status, and there is some question of whether it has acquired
the force of customary inter-American human rights law. The statements
in Filartigav. Pefia-Irala13 9 concerning the binding nature of the Universal
Declaration, however, provide a basis for the argument that the American
Declaration is part of inter-American customary law. Regardless of its status in customary law, one commentator referred to the American Declaration as "a document of great importance, of moral force . . . [and] a

'sacred' instrument of ideals which the member states of the OAS should

respect."1

40

The OAS adopted the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention)' 4 ' at the 1969 Inter-American Specialized Conference on
Human Rights in San Jose. The American Convention, which entered
into force in 1978, complements the American Declaration in scope, detail,
and enforcement mechanism and emphasizes political and civil rights.
The American Convention reiterates themes and principles of the American Declaration, the Universal Declaration, 4 2 the International Covenants, 143 and the European Convention. 144 Article 2 of the American
Convention provides that the civil and political rights and freedoms enumerated in the American Convention, which are not already insured by a
state party, should be adopted through necessary legislation or other measures. The United States understanding of this article is that the Convention is not self-executing. A state has the choice of either relying solely on
domestic law to implement the articles of the treaty or incorporating the
American Convention's provisions as domestic law. 145 One United States
court has cited article 5 of the American Convention
as evidence of an
146
"international consensus" on the use of torture.
138. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted by the Ninth
International Conference of American States Mar. 30-May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965).
139. 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980).
140. L. LEBLANC, THE OAS AND THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 18 (1977).
141. American Convention, supra note 6.
142. Universal Declaration, supra note 2.
143. ICCPR, supra note 4; ICESCR, supra note 3.
144. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, done Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter cited as European Convention].
145. INTER-AMERICAN SPECIALIZED CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ACTA DE LA
SEGUNDA SESION PLENARIA (SUMMARY) Doc. 86, 85 (1969), cited in L. LEBLANC, supra
note 140, at 21 n.42.
146. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980).
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III. ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS CUSTOMARY LAW
International human rights may also be enforced through customary international law. It is an accepted principle that customary international
law is "part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." 14 7 The
1980 draft of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States states that customary law has the same status as treaty law; it supersedes inconsistent state and local laws and prior, inconsistent federal
laws.148 The question whether customary international law includes protection of individual rights has been addressed in a precedent-setting 1980
opinion by the Second Circuit 149 and in other recent federal cases. Those
courts that have acknowledged an obligation to enforce international
human rights through customary law have accepted the interntional consensus that customary international law evolves and changes. Other courts
have closed their eyes to the developments in the international law of indi-

vidual rights.
Courts face two major issues when considering whether they may apply
customary international law to protect individual rights-whether customary international law may be invoked by an individual in a United States
court and how to establish that a particular right is protected by customary
international law.
Filartigav. Pefia-lrala150 is the leading case concerning the enforcement
of human rights through customary law. In Filartiga,two Paraguayan
citizens brought an action in New York against a former police official
from Paraguay for wrongfully causing the death by torture of Joelto Filartiga in Paraguay. The defendant resided in the United States and was
served with a summons and complaint following his arrest for overstaying
his visa. The plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and under the Alien Tort Claims Act,1I' which provides that
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
147. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
148. RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 102, 1310), 135(t) (Tent. Draft 1980). For a criticism of this statement, see
Goldklang, Customary International Law and United States Law, 22 INTERNATIONAL
PRACTITIONERs' NOTEBOOK 16-17 (1983). But see quote from Legal Advisor regarding the

United States use of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which
constitute codification of customary international law cited supra note 107. For a general
discussion of this issue see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRs AND THE CONSTITUTION 221-23

(1972).
149. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
150. Id.
151. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976). The Act is seldom invoked and

only rarely invoked successfully. See, e.g., Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 Fed. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795),
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treaty of the United States." The district court had dismissed for want of
jurisdiction; 152 in reversing, the Second Circuit held that official torture
violates the law of nations and that the exercise of federal jurisdiction
over
1 53
the plaintiffs' action was consistent with the Constitution.
The Filartigacourt's ruling in favor of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Claims Act was based on its understanding of "modem international
law."' 154 The court recognized that subjects once considered solely matters
of domestic jurisdiction can in time become subjects of new rules of customary international law.155 Thus, the court concluded that official torture
is now prohibited in customary international law, just as piracy and slave
trade have been prohibited since an earlier era. 156 It stated that "courts
must interpret international law not as it was in 1789,
but as it has evolved
57
and exists among the nations of the world today."'
To determine whether a prohibition against torture is currently part of
customary international law, the Filartiga court applied the traditional
analysis enunciated in UnitedStates v. Smith:158 "The law of nations...
may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly
on public laws; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."' 159 For "the works of
jurists" the court in Filartigarelied on affidavits of four "distinguished international legal scholars, who stated unanimously that the law of nations
prohibits absolutely the use of torture."' 160 For "judicial opinions" the
court consulted only a 1978 decision of the European Court of Human
Rights' 6 1 that interpreted the European Convention's prohibition against
62

torture.1

Most important, the Filartiga court relied on "the usage of nations,"
which it found was evidenced in several ways. First, the court found that
articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter clearly establish that "in
citedin Filartiga,630 F.2d at 887 n.21. The Act was used successfully in Bolchos in a suit to
determine title to slaves on board an enemy vessel.
The Alien Tort Statute treats only one kind of jurisdiction in dealing with human rights
violations that arise in other countries. Another kind of jurisdiction may be obtained under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. For a recent discussion of this statute in the
context of human rights issues see, Comment, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and
InternationalHuman Rights Agreements: How They Co-Exist, 17 U.S.F.L. Rpy. 71 (1982).
152. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 880.
153. Id. at 887.
154. Id. at 884-85.
155. Id. at 889.
156. Id. at 890.
157. Id. at 881.
158. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820). See also The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
159. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 160-61.
160. 630 F.2d at 879.
161. Ireland v. U.K., [1978] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 602 (Eur. Ct. of
Human Rights).
162. See 630 F.2d at 884 n.16.
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this modem age a state's treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international concern."' 163 Second, the court looked to the Universal Declaration' 64 and the Declaration on Torture 6 5 to determine whether
international human rights include a right to be free from torture. Both
Declarations were unanimously adopted as resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly. The Filartiga court cited the Declarations for
their contributions, in some undefined way, to customary law. 16 6 Although the court quoted several authorities on the precise legal effect of a
United Nations declaration, it did not choose among the various theories
and thus did not decide whether a declaration is binding in full as part of
customary international law; an expression of expectations that becomes
binding by custom only to the extent that this is justified by state practice;
or an authoritative statement of the international community that does not
quite fit into the binding, non-binding dichotomy. 167 Third, the court
looked for "the modem usage and practice of nations" in the express
prohibitions against torture in three multilateral treaties' 6 8-the
71
ICCPR, 169 the American Convention, 170 and the European Convention.'
Fourth, the court noted the existence of antitorture proscriptions in the
laws of many nations and the general renunciation of torture by all nations. It added that "the fact that the prohibition of torture is often
honored in the breach does not diminish its binding effect as a norm of
international law."' 172 Finally, the court looked to the "usage and practice" of the United States in particular, referring to a Department of State
report that "[t]here now exists an international consensus that recognizes
basic human rights and obligations owed by all governments to their citizens."' 173 It relied also on an amicus curiae brief submitted by the Depart174
ment of State and the Department of Justice.
The court of appeals agreed that these sources showed that the law of
nations includes a prohibition against official torture. The court remanded
to the district court with the comment that its decision on jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Claims Act did not preclude the lower court from
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 881.
Universal Declaration, supra note 2.
Declaration on Torture, supra note 7.
630 F.2d at 883-84.
Id. at 883.
Id. at 883-84.
ICCPR, supra note 4.
American Convention, supra note 6.
European Convention, supra note 144.
630 F.2d at 884 n.15.
Id. at 884, citing HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN

AFFAIRS AND SENATE COMM. ON

FOREIGN RELATIONS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESs., DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 1979 (Joint Comm. Print 1980).

174. 630 F.2d at 884.
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deciding to apply Paraguayan law,175 dismissing on grounds of forum non
177
conveniens,1 76 or declaring the suit barred by the act of state doctrine.
Six months after the Filartiga decision, two federal district courts decided detention cases by relying in part or entirely on customary international law.' 78 Fernandezv. Wilkinson 179 held that the indefinite detention
of a Cuban refugee violated international law. Fernandez was convicted
of crimes in Cuba before arriving in the United States in the 1980
"freedom flotilla." The Immigration and Naturalization Service deemed
Fernandez an excludable alien and ordered him held in a maximum security prison pending deportation. The time for deportation was undetermined because no country was willing to receive Fernandez. Kansas Legal
Services entered the case as amicus curiae and argued that arbitrary and
indefinite detention is prohibited by customary international law and is an
abuse of discretion on the part of the Attorney General.
In determining whether international law includes this prohibition, the
80
Fernandez court looked for "evidence of a wide practice by states."'
Following the lead of Filartiga, the court relied on the general human
rights obligations in the United Nations Charter and the specific prohibitions against arbitrary detention contained in the Universal Declaration181
and in the three major multilateral treaties defining civil and political
rights-the ICCPR, t82 the American Convention, 13 3 and the European
Convention. 8 4 The court also considered writings of scholars and jurists
that indicate that the standards of the Universal Declaration are part of
customary law. 8 5 For judicial opinions, the court turned to one international arbitration case concerning arbitrary and prolonged detention of a
foreigner, 86 and referred to United States cases condemning arbitrary detention.1 87 Finally, the court found further evidence, in United States foreign aid statutes and in statements by members of the United States
Congress and the executive branch, that recognizes an international legal
right to freedom from arbitrary detention. 88
175. Id. at 889 n.25.
176. Id. at 890.
177. Id. at 889-90.
178. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980); affd sub nor. on other
grounds, Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); Lareau v.
Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980), modied, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
179. 505 F. Supp. 787.
180. Id. at 795.
181. Universal Declaration, supra note 2.
182. ICCPR, supra note 4.
183. American Convention, supra note 6.
184. European Convention, supra note 144.
185. 505 F. Supp. at 796.
186. Id. at 798 citing Case of Madame Julien Chevreau (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.) arbitrated and
decided at the Hague (June 4, 1931).
187. 505 F. Supp. at 798. The court referred to several United States cases, including
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1957) and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386 (1798).
188. 505 F. Supp. at 799.
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The Fernandez court concluded that arbitrary detention violates interna8 9 and
90
tional law, which, as stated in The Paquete Habana1
Filartiga,1
must be applied by federal courts in appropriate cases. Because the court
had already determined that Fernandez was not protected by United
States law from arbitrary detention in these circumstances, the court applied customary international law. Finding that indeterminate detention
in a maximum security prison violated customary international law, the
court held that the detention constituted an abuse of discretion by the
Attorney General and ordered the petitioner released.191
Fernandez was affirmed on appeal, but on United States statutory
grounds.' 92 The court of appeals, however, cited "accepted international
law principles" to support its construction of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 193 In dicta, the court said that Fernandez's detention also violated the United States Constitution and considered international law
principles in its interpretation of the Constitution.' 94 Citing the arbitrary
arrest provisions of the Universal Declaration 95 and the American Convention, 196 the court of appeals declared that "no principle of international
law is more fundamental than the concept that human beings should be
free from arbitrary imprisonment."' 197
In Lareau v. Manson, 198 international standards for treatment of prisoners were cited primarily as an aid in interpreting the eighth amendment' 99
and as "part of the body of international human rights principles establishing standards for decent and humane conduct by all nations. '200 The
court discussed in lengthy footnotes, 20 ' however, other possible legal effects of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners (Standard Minimum Rules). 202 The court hinted that the Standard Minimum Rules might constitute customary law even though they
are contained in an Economic and Security Council resolution rather than
in a treaty or a General Assembly declaration. 203 The court also suggested
that the Rules are relevant to litigation in United States courts to explain
189. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
190. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See discussion supra accompanying notes 150-78.
191. 505 F. Supp. at 798.
192. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
193. Id. at 1390.
194. Id. at 1388 (construing Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1223,
1252 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981)).
195. Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 9.
196. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 9.
197. 654 F.2d at 1388.
198. 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980). For a detailed discussion of this issue, see infra
part IV.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

507 F. Supp. at 1187-89.
507 F. Supp. at 1192-93.
Id. at 1187-89 n.9, 1193 nn.18, 19.
Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 7.
507 F. Supp. at 1188 n.9.
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the Universal Declaration
the meaning of provisions of the ICCPR 2and
°4
that are or may be part of customary law.

In Sorca-Gonzales v. Civiletti, 2°5 a case similar to Fernandez, the court
ordered the release of an indefinitely detained, excludable alien from
Cuba. The court based its decision on domestic law and refused to adopt
the petitioner's argument that the domestic legal principles should be construed with the aid of international human rights law. Without citation to
authority the court questioned whether an alien in the petitioner's position
is entitled to invoke international human rights principles. The court
stated, however, that if required to decide the international law issue, it
would find that petitioner's detention violated
the Universal Declaration,
2°6
the American Convention, and the ICCPR.
In Verlinden B. V v. CentralBank ofNigeria,20 7 an action by a foreign
corporation against a foreign sovereign, the court noted the Filartigaholding on jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act, but distinguished it
on the ground that, although physical torture violates
the law of nations,
208
the commercial acts at issue in Verlinden did not.

In contrast, two district courts have disagreed with the Filartigaline of
cases and have refused to apply international human rights law on the
ground that customary international law cannot be enforced by an individual. In In re Alien Children Education Litigation,20 9 the court acknowledged that customary international law must be applied as federal law, but
refused to recognize that customary international law provides rights enforceable by an individual. The court stated that individual rights in customary international law could be invoked only by a nation against
another nation in an international tribunal. In Hanoch Tel-Oren,210 the
court used the term "law of nations generally" rather than "customary
law." 2 11 Without discussing the content of the law of nations, the court
stated that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated the existence of a specific
right to a private claim under the law of nations 21 2 and had failed to establish jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act.2 13 Thus, the court di-

rectly contradicted Filartiga.
The difference between the two cases above and the Filarigaline is that
the latter acknowledges the post-World War II developments that have
expanded international law to encompass certain rights of individuals in
204. Id. at 1193 n.18.
205. 515 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
206. Id. at 1061 n.18.
207. 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, No. 81-920 (U.S. May 23, 1983).
208. Id. at 325 n.16.
209. 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), af'd, No. 80-1807 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 1981), affd
sub nom, Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
210. 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
211. 517 F. Supp. at 546.
212. Id. at 547-48.
213. Id. at 549.
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respect to their own governments. In addition, the Hanoch Tel-Oren decision expresses the fear sometimes reflected in other international law decisions that enforcement of international law may impermissibly interfere
with foreign affairs and international relations. By contrast, Filartigawas
decided by a court educated in modern international law, which recognized its constitutional authority and responsibility to apply that law in
appropriate cases.
The developing case law offers some general rules concerning the enforcement of customary international human rights law in United States
courts. First, the weight of authority favors an individual's right to invoke
international human rights standards as customary international law that a
court must apply as a part of federal law. Second, the standards contained
in the Universal Declaration 21 4 and the major multilateral human rights
treaties215 are either part of customary international law or are the most
important evidence of the content of customary international human rights
law. Third, other evidence particularly helpful in establishing customary
law includes modern scholarly writing stating that various international
human rights documents are part of customary law and supporting statements by United States government officials. Judicial opinions are not
helpful because few international tribunals issue decisions on human
rights upon the complaint of an individual.
Recent decisions also raise questions about the use of customary international human rights law in United States courts. First, in spite of the
expansive language of Filartigaand other cases indicating that the Universal Declaration, various treaties, and other international documents constitute or reflect customary law, it is possible that not all provisions in those
documents would be accepted as binding in a United States court. Some
basis must be found for distinguishing among the types of documents with
reference to such factors as age, nature, and usage.2 16 Distinctions must
also be made among the provisions within a document. 21 7 Filartigahints
that its broad statements in favor of application of the international documents may in fact be limited in practice. For example, Filartigacompares
'218
the torturer to a slave trader and a pirate, "an enemy of all mankind.
Second, although Filartiga possibly paves the way for application of the
norms of international human rights treaties as customary international
law, the court also comments gratuitously regarding the direct enforcement
214. Universal Declaration, supra note 2.
215. American Convention, supra note 6; ICCPR, supra note 4; ICESCR, supra note 3;
European Convention, supra note 144.
216. For example, compare the Universal Declaration, supra note 2, with a more recent
General Assembly declaration or a treaty.
217. For example, compare article 5 of the Universal Declaration, supra note 2, with
article 26(3), which provides that "parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education
that shall be given to their children."
218. 630 F.2d at 890.
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of human rights treaties as the law of the land. The Filartiga court expressly, and without analysis, deems nonself-executing the OAS Charter
and articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter.2 19 Third, the effects
of the Fi/artiga holding that jurisdiction can be exercised over human
rights violations under the Alien Tort Claims Act may be emasculated by
the court's comments concerning choice of law, forum non conveniens,
2 20
and the act of state doctrine.
IV.

USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO HELP EXPAND
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW

Perhaps the most successful use of international human rights law in
state and federal courts has been its assistance in defining rights under
state and federal law.22 1 This use has been particularly prevalent in prison
cases, but there are many other areas in which international human rights
instruments may be used to help interpret rights and protections under
United States law. Part IV reviews the cases that have used international
human rights instruments in this way and makes suggestions for their possible future use. The standards for protection of human rights in the
United States should not be weaker than the standards of international
law. Otherwise, the United States will lag behind the rest of the world in
protecting human rights. To avoid this result, federal and state courts can
use internationally recognized standards to interpret the protections afforded by domestic constitutions, statutes, and other laws. For example,
the concepts of equal protection and due process should not mean less in
United States courts than under international norms. The courts should
use internationally recognized norms to interpret national law to include
comparable rights and protections.
A.

Recent Cases
1. Prisoners and Other Institutionalized Persons

The protection of prisoners' rights is the first area in which international
human rights law provides helpful guidelines. In Lareau v. Manson,22 2 a
219. Id. at 881-82 n.9.
220. These and other issues have been addressed in many scholarly commentaries. See,
e.g., Bilder, Integrating International Human Rights Law into Domestic LawL-U.S.
Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981); Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over
InternationalHumanRights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pefla-Irala,
22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981); Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform
ConstitutionalInterpretation, 4 Hous. J. ILr'L L. 39 (1981); Hassan, Panacea or Mirage?
Domestic Enforcement ofInternationalHuman Rights Law: Recent Cases, 4 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 13 (1981); Note, Torture as a Tort in Violation of InternationalLaw: Filartiga v. PeflaIrala, 33 STAN. L. REv. 353, 357 (1981); Paust, supra note 20; Schneebaum, International
Law as Guarantorof JudiciallyEnforceableRights: A Reply to Professor Oliver, 4 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 65 (1981).
221. See Christenson, supra note 220; Paust, supra note 20.
222. 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980),modpfed, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981). See supra
text accompanying notes 198-204.
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case concerning the detention of pretrial detainees, the court used the
Standard Minimum Rules223 to determine what conditions constitute overcrowding.2 24 In addition to noting that Connecticut had adopted the Standard Minimum Rules, the court stated that those standards are also
important as "obligations to the international community of the member
states of the United Nations. ' 22 5 Although the court did not base its decision solely on these international standards, the standards were useful in
determining when overcrowding exists.
The Oregon Supreme Court in Sterling v. Cupp226 similarly used the
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration, and the ICCPR
as examples of principles governing the treatment of prisoners. In upholding an injunction against patdowns of prisoners' sexual areas by guards of
the opposite sex unless there are special circumstances that warrant it, the
court cited the pledge under articles 55 and 56 of the Charter to promote
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights, and the obligations
under article 5 of the Universal Declaration 22 7 and articles 7 and 10 of the
ICCPR22 8 as expressions of the "concern with minimizing needlessly
harsh, degrading, or dehumanizing treatment of prisoners." 229 The court
also referred to the European Convention, the American Convention, and
the Standard Minimum Rules.
One of the most useful provisions applicable to confined persons is
the prohibition of not only "torture," but also "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. '230 First, the phrase "cruel, inhuman or degrading" proscribes much more conduct than the eighth amendment
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment." Second, the phrase
"treatment or punishment" makes the prohibition applicable to nonpunishment cases. This prohibition is particularly important with respect to
that the eighth amendment is
mental institutions because it has been held
23 1
not applicable to noncriminal penalties.
Furthermore, the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities is considering a draft of Prin232
ciples for the Protection of Persons Suffering from Mental Disorders.
Those principles will articulate specific protections for persons in mental
institutions just as the Standard Minimum Rules provide protections for
persons confined in prisons. The Standard Minimum Rules have been
223. Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 7.
224. 507 F. Supp. at 1187 n.9.
225. Id. at 1188 n.9.
226. 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
227. Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 5.
228. ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 7, 10.
229. 290 Or. at n.21, 625 P.2d at 131 n.21.
230. See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 7; Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 5.
231. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1971).
232. Draft Body of Principles for the Protection of Persons Suffering from Mental
Disorders, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4 /Sub. 2/NGO.81.
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adopted by several states in the United States; the Principles for the Protection of Persons Suffering from Mental Disorders could similarly be
233
adopted and used in national tribunals.
Two California decisions have suggested that international human
rights standards should be utilized in the protection of mentally incompetent persons. In Conservatorship of Hofferber,234 Justice Newman mentioned the concern of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities with the treatment of persons detained on the grounds of mental illness 235 in support of his conclusion that "the state has compelling interests in public safety and inhumane
treatment of the mentally disturbed. ' 236 Disagreeing with the majority decision in Cramer v. Tyars,237 Justice Newman noted that requiring a mentally retarded person to testify in a trial can be cruel and degrading, in
238
violation of article 5 of the Universal Declaration.
Lawyers concerned with prison practices should note in particular the
protection in article 7 of the ICCPR, which states that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent
to medical or scientific experimentation. ' 239
2. Education
Education cases constitute the second area in which international
human rights law has been used. For example, in Doe v. Plyler,240 the
court cited article 47 of the Protocol of Buenos Aires 24 ' as an indication of
the United States commitment to expanding educational opportunity. 242
The court cited the Protocol to support its holding that a Texas statute
entitling only United States citizens or lawfully admitted aliens to attend
public schools free of charge violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
In Tayyari v. New Mexico State University,243 the court cited an affidavit
by David Newsom, Department of State Undersecretary for Political
Affairs, referring to the United States policy of support for the development of international human rights standards as expressed in the Universal Declaration and the ICESCR. 244 The affidavit mentioned the
233. See Herr, Rights into Action: ProtectingHuman Rights of the Mentally Handicapped,
26 CATH. U.L. RaV. 203, 210-15 (1977).
234. 28 Cal. 3d 161, 616 P.2d 836, 167 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1980).
235. Id. at 172 n.9, 616 P.2d at 844 n.9, 167 Cal Rptr. at 862 n.9.
236. Id. at 171, 616 P.2d at 844, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
237. 23 Cal. 3d 131, 588 P.2d 793, 151 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1979).
238. Id. at 151, 588 P.2d at 805, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 665 (Newman, J., dissenting).
239. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 7.
240. 458 F. Supp. 569, 592, (E.D. Tex. 1978), a'd, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), 102 S.
Ct. 2382 (1982).
241. Protocol of Buenos Aires, supra note 124.
242. 458 F. Supp. at 592.
243. 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980).
244. Id. at 1378-79.
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provisions requiring equal access for all to higher education without discrimination on the basis of national origin or other status 245 and concluded
that "[t]he introduction of such discrimination by law within a jurisdiction
of the United States would be damaging to United States efforts to promote the widest realization internationally of human rights goals and standards. '2 46 The court cited the provisions of the affidavit to support its
conclusion that a motion passed by the Regents of New Mexico State University that would deny admission or readmission of Iranian students violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. The
court struck down the motion on the grounds that it discriminated both on
the basis of alienage and national origin.
B. Suggestionsfor Future Use
There are many areas in which international human rights law provides
broader protections than national law. The remainder of this Article provides examples of areas in which human rights standards can be used to
interpret state and federal law to afford greater protection of human rights.
1. Protections Against Discrimination
International prohibitions against discrimination are sometimes more
explicit and more extensive than those in federal and state law. The
Universal Declaration and the ICCPR require protection of rights "without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status. '2 47 A comparison of this language with statutes prohibiting discrimination in the United States reveals that the international protections
are much broader. For example, in California the Unruh Civil Rights
Act 248 prohibits discrimination on the basis of "sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, or national origin." This list of prohibited kinds of discrimination has been held to be illustrative rather than restrictive,2 49 and the statute presumably could encompass additional prohibitions against
245. See article 26(1) of the Universal Declaration, which states that "[e]veryone has the
right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental
stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education
shall be made generally available and higher education shallbe equally accessibleto all on the
basis of merit" (emphasis added). Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 26(1). See also
article 13(2)(c) of the ICESCR, which provides: "Higher education shall be made equally
accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by
the progressive introduction of free education[.]" ICESCR, supra note 3, art. 13(2)(c).
246. Tayyari, 495 F. Supp. at 1379.
247. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2(2); Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 2. See also
article 2(2) of the ICESCR, supra note 3, which contains nearly identical language.
248. Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (1974).
249. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 216, 474 P.2d 992, 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 31 (1970). See
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discrimination on the broader bases of "language, . . political or other
opinion .... .social origin, property, birth or other status." The internathe Unruh Civil
tional documents could, therefore, be used to interpret
250
Rights Act to include the additional prohibitions.
The prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sex are more explicit in the international documents. Although the United States
Supreme Court has struck down a number of statutes that discriminate on
the basis of gender, the Court's less-than-strict scrutiny standard has led it
to uphold various statutes that distinguish between men and women in
granting benefits and employment opportunities. 25 ' The ICESCR, how25 2
ever, specifically forbids the unequal treatment of men and women.
Furthermore, article 10(2) of the ICESCR provides that special protections
should be afforded mothers for a reasonable time before and after childbirth, including paid leaves from employment or leaves with adequate social security benefits. Although the passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA)2 53 would have accorded women in the United States
also Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 32 Cal. 3d 603, 608 n.4, P.2d - n.4, - Cal. Rptr. - n.4 (1982).
250. The rights of physically disabled persons may be an area in which the prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of any status would be useful. See, e.g., March v.
Edwards Theatres Circuit, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 881, 134 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1976), in
which the court refused to apply California Civil Code § 51 to a case involving a physically
handicapped plaintiff. The court based its decision on the fact that another section of the
Code applied specifically to the physically handicapped and that both sections allow for
reasonable regulations by business facilities. Because a private cause of action was not
allowed, however, the court's holding treated a physically handicapped person differently
from persons discriminated against on the basis of other characteristics. International norms
might have been useful in arguing that the California statute should allow the physically
handicapped plaintiff the same rights to a cause of action as persons subjected to other types
of discrimination. See.4m. Nat'lIns. Co. v. FairEmployment & Hous. Comm'n, in which the
court utilized pronouncements of the Advisory Committee for the International Year of
Disabled Persons in defining "physical handicap." Id. at 609 n.5, - P.2d at - n.5, - Cal.
Rptr. at - n.5.
251. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948); Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
252. See, e.g., article 3 of the ICESCR, which states that "[t]he States Parties to the
present Covenant undertake to ensure the equalright ofmen and women to the enjoyment of
all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant" (emphasis added).
ICESCR, supra note 3, art. 3. See also article 7, which states that:
The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular:
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of
work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work
(emphasis added).
See also ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 3.
253. 14 U.S.C.A. § 446 (West Supp. 1982). The June 30, 1982 deadline for the ERA's
ratification passed without ratification by a sufficient number of state legislatures. The ERA
has been reintroduced twice since that time.
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many of these additional protections and rights, the international stanStates law and the
dards may be used to interpret both present United
2 54
language of future statute's similar to the ERA.
It may also be argued that the ICCPR and the ICESCR afford greater
protections to aliens. Recent cases in federal courts have clarified that not
all discrimination against aliens violates the Constitution. 55 The nondiscrimination provisions of the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the Universal
Declaration make it clear that there can be no unjustifiable discrimination
on the basis of national origin, birth, or other status.2 56 These prohibitions
may encompass discrimination against undocumented workers, 257 and illethe ICCPR and the
gitimate children may have greater protection under258
ICESCR than under the United States Constitution.
One additional instrument of particular importance is the International
259
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
It explicitly provides that certain affirmative action measures are not to be
deemed racial discrimination and, in fact, may be required.2 60 The Convention evidences and defines the strong worldwide consensus on the difficult issues troubling our courts. The international community's approach
should at least be persuasive and may indeed be directly applicable in
United States courts and agencies. 26 1 The ICCPR at least arguably proaction, but also against
tects the individual not only against government
2 62
persons acting in their official capacity.
2. Criminal Justice
Several international provisions relating to criminal justice may provide
greater protection than United States law, and state and federal law should
254. For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Comment, The Covenant on Civil and
PoliticalRights as the Law of the Land, 25 VILL. L. REV. 119, 130-33 (1979-80).
255. For a discussion of these cases, see id. at 133-34.
256. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 3, art. 2; Universal
Declaration, supra note 2, art. 2.
257. See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 26. But compare id. arts. 13, 14, which appear to
provide different standards governing proceedings for the expulsion of aliens.
258. See Comment, supra note 254, at 134.
259. Convention on Discrimnation, supra note 7. As of December 1980, 106 countries
were party to this treaty. The United States signed the treaty on September 28, 1966, but has
not ratified it.
260. Id. arts. 1(4), 2(2).
261. In addition to the basic human rights instruments discussed above, lawyers should
be aware of the dozens of other documents further defining the content of human rights. See
the partial list of United Nations human rights treaties and declarations, supra note 7. The
International Labor Organization and the United Nations Economic and Social Council
have also adopted many human rights instruments.
262. Article 2 of the ICCPR states in relevant part that "[e]ach State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes ... [t]o ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation
ICCPR, supra note 4,
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity .
art. 2.
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be interpreted to encompass these greater protections. First, the double
jeopardy prohibition 263 in international law.probably proscribes successive
state and federal prosecutions permitted by the United States Constitution. 264 The international law double jeopardy prohibition could be used
as a general principle to support an interpretation of domestic law even
when the international law itself is not directly applied. Second, the
ICCPR and the American Convention require that a criminal offender
benefit from a legislated reduction in penalty that occurs after his or her
crime. 265 This is required neither by federal law 266 nor by all state law.
Third, greater protection against ill treatment in detention is afforded
under the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR. 267 Other protections offered by international law, which are not generally a part of domestic law,
include compensation for persons who have suffered punishment from a
miscarriage of justice,268 segregation of accused from convicted detainees,269 segregation of juveniles from adults in detention facilities, 270 and
prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty on persons below eighteen years of age and on pregnant women. 27 ' These are only some examples of the possible areas in which international human rights standards
may be used to interpret United States laws to ensure greater protection of
human rights.

263. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 8; ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 14(7).
264. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Ill., 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959) (holding that successive state and federal prosecutions for the same offense are not
barred by the United States Constitution). But see Benton v. Md., 365 U.S. 784 (1969).
265. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 9; ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 15(1).
266. 1 U.S.C. § 109 (1947); United States v. Kirby, 176 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1949).
267. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 7; Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 5.
268. Article 14(6) of the ICCPR provides that
[w]hen a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and
when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on
the ground tat a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has
been conviction
a miscarriage
of justice,
the person who has suffered punishment as a result of
such
shall
be compensated
according to law, unless it is proved that the
non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
269. Article 10(2)(a) of the ICCPR provides that "[a]ccused persons shall, save in
exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons and shall be subject to
separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons . ... "
270. Article 10(2)(b) of the ICCPR provides that "[a]ccused juvenile persons shall be
separated from adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication."
271. Id. art. 6(5). In Eddings v. Okla., 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982), counsel cited this provision
in oral argument as an example of international consensus that persons who commit crimes
when they are under eighteen years of age should not be subjected to the death penalty.

